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Introduction
By the early part of the twentieth century, academia in the English-speaking
world had stabilized (or ossified!) into a set of scientific and humanistic disciplines that
still survives at the century’s end.    The natural sciences have such disciplines as physics,
chemistry, and biology, and the social sciences include economics, psychology, and
sociology.    These disciplines provide a convenient organizing principle for university
departments and professional organizations, but they often bear little relation to cutting-
edge research, which can concern topics that cut across or occur at the boundaries of two
or more of the established disciplines.     When this happens,  productive research and
teaching must be interdisciplinary.
Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary study of mind, embracing psychology,
artificial intelligence, philosophy, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology.    It is
undoubtedly one of the major interdisciplinary successes of the twentieth century, with its
own  society,  journal,  and  textbooks,   and  with  more  than  sixty  cognitive science
programs established at universities in North American and Europe.     This paper is an
attempt to answer the question:   What are the factors contributing to the success of the
interdisciplinary field of cognitive science?
My discussion is organized around the metaphor of the trading zone, a novel and
fertile analogy that Gallison (1997) developed for his rich and detailed discussion of the
practices  of  twentieth-century  physics.   To  understand  the  diverse  groups  of2
experimenters and theoreticians, Gallison presents their interactions in terms of the
trading zones described by anthropologists:
Subcultures trade.  Anthropologists have extensively studied how different
groups,  with  radically  different  ways  of  dividing  up  the  world  and
symbolically organizing its parts, can not only exchange goods but also
depend essentially on those trades.    Within a certain cultural arena - what
I call in chapter 9 the “trading zone” - two dissimilar groups can find
common ground.    They can exchange fish for baskets, enforcing subtle
equations of correspondence between quantity, quality, and type, and yet
utterly  disagree  on  the  broader  (global)  significance  of  the  items
exchanged.   Similarly, between the scientific subcultures of theory and
experiment, or even between different traditions of instrument making or
different subcultures of theorizing, there can be exchanges (coordinations),
worked out in exquisite local detail, without global agreement (Gallison
1997, p. 46).
He uses this analogy to depict the interactions of theory and experiment in a way that
appreciates the  importance of both to the development of physics.  Klein (this volume)
also compares developing an interdisciplinary perspective to entering another culture.
What are the trading zones in cognitive science?   Inevitably, there are difficulties
of communication and cooperation faced by researchers from the particular fields of
cognitive science as they attempt to work with people from other fields.    But, just as
traders  from  different  cultural  groups  have  often  succeeded  in  overcoming  their
differences, so cognitive scientists have frequently surmounted disciplinary barriers.
This paper describes how successful interdisciplinary work in cognitive science has been
possible because of important people, places, organizations, ideas, and methods.    I begin
with a description of some of the key people in the early days of cognitive science in the
1950s, and show how the fact that each of them had strong interdisciplinary interests was3
important for getting the field underway.     I then describe how a number of universities
in the 1960s and 1970s provided fertile places where cognitive science work could
develop, and recount how the Cognitive Science Society and the journal Cognitive
Science began to contribute to interdisciplinary work.      But the point of this paper is not
merely sociological, for I want also to describe some of the ideas and methods of
cognitive science that make the field hold together as more than just a bunch of people
getting together to chat about the mind.    As a more specific example of interdisciplinary
research in cognitive science, I describe how understanding of analogical thinking has
improved dramatically as the result of people, places, organizations, ideas, and methods.
Finally, I conclude with a summary of what the discussion of trading zones in cognitive
science contributes to understanding of the past successes and future prospects of
cognitive science.
Interestingly, an anthropological metaphor has already been used by cognitive
science educators quite independently of Gallison’s account of trading zones in physics.
Janet  Kolodner (1994) discussed pidgin and creole languages, which emerge when
cultures trade,  in her report on a workshop held to promote cognitive science education.
She summarized some remarks by Paul Smolensky:
Paul's underlying concern was how do we produce the next generation of
cognitive scientists -- the ones who will take cognitive science its next step
forward into a unique and identifiable interdisciplinary endeavor? Based
on  an  earlier  comment  by  Angel  Cabrera,  a  graduate  student  in  the
audience, he made the analogy to naturalistic language evolution where
speakers from a variety of different language backgrounds, when living
together  in  the  same  community,  seem  to  develop  an  impoverished
language, called a pidgen [sic], that allows them to communicate with
each other. The new generation born to the community picks up the
pidgen and develops a new language from it, called a creole. Creoles are4
real languages, as structured and expressive as other languages. One can,
however, see the roots, in creoles, of the languages they derived from.
Now for the analogy. We are currently a group of researchers from a
variety of different disciplines trying to communicate with each other. We
have developed pidgens to allow us to communicate and collaborate. Few
of us, however, are native speakers of Cognitive Science. Most of us come
first from an associated discipline. The argument based on language
theory goes like this: If Cognitive Science is to become an autonomous
discipline, with its own language and methods, then we will need to have
offspring  who  are  born  into  Cognitive  Science,  offspring  for  whom
Cognitive  Science  is  their  first  language,  for  whom  the  natural
environment  is  one  with  members  from  the  variety  of  disciplinary
communities. The new generation will evolve the many pidgen dialects
into a creole, a distinct discipline, with its own methods and issues.
Those of us who have been in cognitive science for some time had hoped
that  our  interdisciplinary  collaborations  and  the  pidgen  dialects  we
developed to communicate across the disciplines would evolve into a
creole --a distinctive, real, hybrid discipline -- but it hasn't happened yet.
Why not, and how can we aim towards a creole.
Even if cognitive science has not developed such an integrated language, it has had
considerable success in tying together disparate disciplines.  Let us now look at some of
the trading zones that have fostered the development of cognitive science.
People
There is no canonical list of the “founders” of cognitive science, but such a list
could not omit the following figures who were active in the mid-1950s eruption of ideas
that provided the intellectual origins of the field:   Noam Chomsky,   George Miller,
Marvin Minsky, Allan Newell, and Herbert Simon.   My aim is not to retell the history of5
cognitive science (Gardner, 1985; Thagard, 1992, ch. 9), but to highlight the origins of
the field in the intense interdisciplinary interests of some its founders.
Noam Chomsky’s theories of grammar revolutionized linguistics in the 1950s and
1960s, and contributed mightily to the downfall of behaviorist theories of language use.
His linguistic theories diverged radically from those of his teacher, Zellig Harris, and
displayed the influence of diverse intellectual sources, including the logicians and
philosophers whom Chomsky read avidly from an early age (Barsky, 1997).  Chomsky’s
early work was inspired in part by such philosophers as Bertrand Russell and Nelson
Goodman.    He published his first paper, “Systems of   Syntactic Analysis,” in the
Journal of Symbolic Logic (Chomsky, 1953).  Before receiving his Ph.D. in linguistics
from the University of Pennsylvania, Chomsky’s spent several years in Harvard’s
interdisciplinary Society of Fellows.   Although Chomsky’s ideas were subsequently to
have a great impact on cognitive psychology and computer science, he does not seem to
have been directly influenced by these fields.    Nevertheless, his early combination of
linguistic and philosophical ideas shows that his research was interdisciplinary from the
start.
George Miller’s 1956 paper, “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two,”
is generally considered to be one of the seminal works in cognitive psychology.  Miller’s
introduction of Shannon’s information theory into psychology was only one of several
interdisciplinary innovations that he produced (Hirst, 1988).    Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram (1960) published what is probably the first book in modern cognitive science,
Plans and the Structure of Behavior.   This book replaced behaviorist notions of reflexes
and associative links with the concept of a plan, a “hierarchical process in the organism
that  can  control  the  order  in  which  a  sequence  of  operations  to  be  performed,
…essentially the same as a program for a computer” (p. 16).      Influenced in part by the
work  of  Newell  and  Simon,  this  book  described  the  psychological  advantages  of
computational ideas and computational simulations.     In the 1960s, Miller collaborated6
with  Chomsky  to  bring  ideas  about  transformational  grammar  to  the  attention  of
psychologists, and in the 1970s Miller coined the term “cognitive neuroscience” to
describe the emerging relevance of brain research to cognitive psychology.   Miller’s own
history exhibits the fertility of combining psychological, mathematical, computational,
linguistic, and neurological interests.
Marvin Minsky was a participant in the 1956 conference at Dartmouth that
inaugurated artificial intelligence, and his contributions to that field and cognitive
psychology have been legion.   As an undergraduate at Harvard, he had three laboratories
of his own, in biology, physics, and psychology, where he worked with George Miller
(Bernstein, 1981; McCorduck, 1979).     His early interests ranged from mathematics to
electronics to psychology, and he did his Ph.D. at Princeton on the mathematics of neural
networks.     Minsky’s (1975) AI paper on frames influenced and was influenced by
psychological work on schemas, and his later Society of Minds theory shows some
Freudian influences (Minsky,  1986).   It is clear that Minsky would not have been drawn
to  artificial intelligence if he had not had from the beginning a strong multidisciplinary
interest in the nature of mind.
Allen Newell and Herbert Simon were also at the 1956 Dartmouth AI conference,
and their interests were more avowedly psychological than Minsky’s.     Simon’s Ph.D.
was in political science, but he had strong early interests in mathematics and psychology.
As a consultant at the RAND corporation, he met a young mathematician, Allen Newell,
who was interested in adding intelligence to the primitive computers of the day.   With
Cliff Shaw, Newell and Simon produced the first artificial intelligence program, which
was also intended to be a model of human thinking.   From the General Problem Solver
through influential later projects, Newell and Simon combined computational and
psychological research (e.g.   Newell and Simon, 1972; Newell, 1990; Simon, 1991).
Newell also made important contributions to computer hardware and the field of human
computer interaction, and Simon’s accomplishments include a Nobel prize in economics7
and valuable philosophical work on causality.   As with Chomsky, Miller, and Minsky,
these two founders of cognitive science were thoroughly interdisciplinary in themselves.
Just as cultural trading zones require people who learn enough of another culture
and language to be able to initiate trade with strangers, so interdisciplinary fields require
individuals who can get them going by each working in more than one field.   I do not
know of any cognitive scientist who can claim to have worked in all six of the constituent
disciplines of cognitive science, but the five seminal figures I have discussed each
operated in two, three, or four of them.   The obvious lesson for interdisciplinary work is:
If you want to start an interdisciplinary field, start with people themselves whose interests
and abilities are already interdisciplinary.  Table 1  summarizes the interests of Chomsky,
Miller,  Minsky,  Newell,  and  Simon,  none  of  whom  has  had  much  to  do  with
anthropology.
artificial
intelligence
linguistics neuroscience philosophy psychology
Chomsky √ √ √
Miller √ √ √ √
Minsky √ √ √
Newell √ √
Simon √ √ √
Table 1.   Interdisciplinary interests of some of the founders of cognitive science.
Places
The development of an interdisciplinary field requires more than a few brilliant
individuals who generate ideas at the intersection of established disciplines.    It also
requires  institutions  that  provide  opportunities  for  interdisciplinary  contacts  and
collaborations.   In its early days, before the term “cognitive science” was coined in the
1970s, cognitive science benefited from several places where interdisciplinary work8
flourished.     In this section I will describe the impact of two important institutions, the
Graduate School of Industrial Administration at the Carnegie Institute of Technology,
and the Center for Cognitive Studies at Harvard University.
In 1955, Allen Newell went to Pittsburgh to work and do a Ph.D. with his
collaborator, Herbert Simon.  Simon was a professor in the Graduate School of Industrial
Administration at what was then Carnegie Tech and is now Carnegie Mellon University.
This school was sufficiently flexible that Simon’s students, who later included Edward
Feigenbaum and many other important early contributors to artificial intelligence, could
receive Ph.D. degrees for computational models of human thinking.    Simon was
instrumental  in  the  reconstitution   in  the  early  1960s  of  Carnegie’s  psychology
department as a major concentrator   on cognition, and in the creation in 1965 of its
computer science department, which to this days retains ties with psychology through
joint appointments such as John R. Anderson. Simon’s efforts in an unlikely location – a
business school in a technical university – produced four decades of influential work in
cognitive science.
In 1960, George Miller and Jerome Bruner founded the Center for Cognitive
Studies at Harvard University, with support from the Carnegie Corporation and Harvard
University.    According to Bruner (1988):
There  was  undoubtedly  a  suspicion  abroad  that  the  old  disciplinary
boundaries, though they had once been useful in shaping the division of
scholarly labors, were no longer the natural joints of the enterprise.  In
circles where this general view prevailed, psychology was believed to be
too narrowly focused on a few traditional problems to deal interestingly
with the nature and uses of the human mind, a view shared by many inside
psychology,  who  felt  that  the  old  behavior  was  a  hopelessly  wrong
epistemological base from which to view the higher functions of the mind.9
Fellows  and  visitors  at  the  center  included  an  amazing  group  of  established  and
beginning scholars from linguistics (e.g. Roman Jakobson, Noam Chomsky), philosophy
(e.g. Nelson Goodman), and psychologists (e.g. Donald Norman, Peter Wason), as well
as other fields.    Miller and Chomsky collaborated on developing a formal theory of
grammar, and at the center Chomsky (1965) completed his influential book, Aspects of
the Theory of Syntax.  Weekly colloquia brought in a broad and distinguished series of
speakers from many disciplines, although there does not seem to have any direct
connection with the artificial intelligence group that Marvin Minsky and John McCarthy
started at MIT in 1957.
According  to  Allan  Collins  (personal  communication),  the  term  “cognitive
science” was created by Daniel Bobrow for their interdisciplinary book, Representation
and Understanding (Bobrow and Collins, 1975).  Explicit cognitive science programs
came into being in the late 1970s, when the Sloan Foundation poured millions of dollars
into new ventures at such institutions as Yale,  MIT,  the University of Pennsylvania, the
University of California at San Diego, and the University of Michigan. Another important
source of funds was the Systems Development Foundation, which established the
interdisciplinary  Center  for  the  Study  of  Language  and  Information  at  Stanford
University and supported research at other universities.    Today, although there are still
very few actual departments of cognitive science in universities, there are numerous
cognitive science programs in the U.S., England, Germany, Canada, and other countries.
My own intellectual trajectory was dramatically affected by cognitive science
programs that I participated in at the University of Michigan in the early 1980s and at
Princeton  University  later  in  that  decade.   Each  institution  provided  an  exciting
interdisciplinary intellectual environment, along with computational and other resources.
Like Harvard in the 1960s and Carnegie Mellon from the late 1950s until today, the
cognitive science programs at Michigan and Princeton brought together people from
several disciplines, both inside and outside the host institution.    Cynics remarked of the10
influx of Sloan Foundation money in the late 1970s that some sciences are theory driven
and others are data driven, but cognitive science is money driven.    But skeptical
predictions that cognitive science programs were transitory results of financial incentives
have been refuted by the large number of thriving programs at the end of the millennium.
Thus an interdisciplinary field needs not only brilliant people to get it going, but
also places where they can work together and where interdisciplinary research is fostered
and encouraged.   Through its relatively short history, cognitive science has seen some
programs flower then fold (e.g. Harvard, Yale), while a few programs have developed
into full-scale departments (e.g. University of California at San Diego, Johns Hopkins
University).    Other programs have shifted their emphases as faculty come and leave.
But there can be little doubt that places such as Carnegie Tech, Harvard’s Center for
Cognitive Studies, and the major centers that arose in the late 1970s contributed greatly
to the development of cognitive science as an interdisciplinary field.
At a more local level, interdisciplinary work can take place in particular research
groups, independent of the umbrella of a general cognitive science program.   Hall,
Stevens, and Torralba (this volume) describe some of the social and cognitive processes
involved in interdisciplinary groups.
Other Organizations
Universities, with their departments,   centers and programs, are not the only
trading zones that produce interdisciplinary contacts.    As part of the mid-1970s jump of
interest in what was by then called cognitive science, the journal Cognitive  Science
began publishing interdisciplinary work in 1977.  The three original joint editors were
Roger Schank (AI), Allan Collins (psychology), and Eugene Charniak (AI).  The initial
editorial board had twenty-nine members, more than half of them from AI; the rest were
psychologists, except for a couple of linguists.    The 1998 editors include three from
psychology and one from AI; and the editorial board has now shifted so that fifteen out of
thirty-two members are psychologists, with eight from AI, four from linguistics, three11
from philosophy, and one each from anthropology and neuroscience.   This classification
is somewhat misleading, however, because many of the current members of the editorial
board do research that crosses over into other disciplines, and several have appointments
in departments of cognitive science.    In the early years, as today, the journal and the
proceedings  of  the  annual  conference  consisted  predominantly  of  articles  that  are
psychological and computational, although papers oriented more toward linguistics,
neuroscience, and philosophy   occasionally appear (for an insightful analysis, see
Schunn, Crowley, and Okada, 1998).
The Cognitive Science Society actually followed the journal, originating in 1979,
although the journal was later given to the Society by its publisher, Ablex.      The
organization began with a meeting at the Dallas airport initiated by Allan Collins, Donald
Norman (who did not want to travel to the East coast), and Roger Schank (who did not
want to travel to the West coast).   The attendees at this meeting were:
Daniel Bobrow, AI, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center.
Eugene Charniak, AI, Brown University.
Allan Collins, Psychology, Bolt Beranek and Newman.
Edward Feigenbaum, AI, Stanford.
Charles Fillmore, linguistics, University of California, Berkeley.
Jerry Fodor, philosophy and psychology, MIT.
Walter Kintsch, psychology, University of Colorado.
Donald Norman, psychology, University of California, San Diego.
Zenon Pylyshyn, psychology, University of Western Ontario.
Raj Reddy, AI, Carnegie Mellon University.
Eleanor Rosch, psychology, University of California, Berkeley.
Roger Schank, AI, Yale.
It is interesting that the twelve founding members of the executive committee included
five artificial intelligence researchers, five psychologists, a philosopher, and a linguist.12
All but four of them were on the original editorial board of the journal, Cognitive
Science.   Since then, the society executive committee (now called the governing board)
has tilted more toward psychology and away from artificial intelligence, reflecting the
evolution of the society.  The thirteen 1998 members of the governing board, include
eight psychologists, three AI researchers, a philosopher and a linguist.    It is notable,
however, that the philosopher (Thagard), the linguist and one of the psychologists each
works with computational models.
According to the minutes of the meeting recorded by Eugene Charniak and
Donald Norman, the two main issues discussed were the nature of the membership of the
organization  and  the  role  of  AI  in  it.    It  was  decided  that  there  should  be  two
membership categories, “Fellow” and “Member,” with fellows being carefully selected
on  the  basis  of  significant  contributions  to  cognitive  science  beyond  the  Ph.D.
dissertation.    The main reason for making this distinction seems to have been to
eliminate the need for refereeing papers at the projected annual conference, following a
model used by the Psychonomic Society.    Later, the categories were changed to
“Member”  and  “Associate  Member,”  and  eventually  the  distinction  was  dropped
altogether and refereeing of conference papers began.    Some members of the first
executive committee thought that the Cognitive Science Society should be an artificial
intelligence society and should try to host an annual AI conference.     But such close
identification was resisted by other members of the committee, and in 1980 the American
Association for Artificial Intelligence was formed and began its own annual meeting.
The Cognitive Science Society Executive Committee met again on August 12, 1979, just
before the first conference of the society at the University of California at San Diego.
Present were Bobrow, Collins, Norman, Pylyshyn, Reddy, Rosch, and Schank, who
agreed to organize the 1980 conference at Yale.
Over the past twenty years, annual meetings of the Cognitive Science Society
have provided the primary site where researchers can gather to present research of13
interdisciplinary interest and gain some idea of what is happening in other fields.
Typically 400-500 people attend, out of the approximately 1000 people who belong to the
Society, and the conference proceedings include hundreds of papers and abstracts.    A
standard feature of the conference is a set of symposia that have speakers from more than
one discipline.     The content of the conference can vary greatly from year to year,
reflecting the different interests of the organizers, who are largely drawn from the host
institution.   It would be very difficult for any one conference to cover the multitude of
topics of interest to the highly diverse membership of the Cognitive Science Society, but
substantial diversity is assured over the course of successive meetings.  One problem for
the society is that involvement by artificial intelligence researchers has dropped off
somewhat over the past two decades,  reflecting the trend in AI toward engineering rather
than cognitive modeling approaches.   On the other hand, involvement by philosophers
seems to be increasing, but linguists and neuroscientists attend their own disciplinary
meetings.
The journal Cognitive Science  has far fewer participants than the conference,
since only about fifteen articles appear in it annually.    It is, however, not the only
interdisciplinary journal in cognitive science, as the following partial list demonstrates:
Behavioral  and  Brain  Sciences,  Cognition,  Computational  Linguistics,  Mind  and
Language.   Moreover, in addition to the annual meetings of the Cognitive Science
Society, there are other conferences where researchers can pursue questions at the
intersection of such fields as linguistics and computation, philosophy and psychology,
cognition and neuroscience, and so on.  The Society for Philosophy and Psychology and
Cognitive Neuroscience Society are two of the organizations that serve to forge links at a
more local level than the entire field of cognitive science.  In addition, every year there
are special-topic conferences on particular aspects of the mind that are geared toward
interdisciplinary  participation,  on  topics  such  as  text  processing,  computer-human
interaction, and  AI and education.14
For the past two decades, then, cognitive science has benefited from having extra-
university organizations that foster its development, particularly the Cognitive Science
Society with its annual conference and journal.   Conferences are probably the closest
analog to intercultural trading zones, as people from various disciplines and countries
gather to exchange ideas.
One would get, however, a feeble anthropological understanding of trading zones
if one concentrated only on the people and places where they meet.   Just as the point of
economic trading zones is the exchange of goods, so the point of intellectual trading
zones is the exchange of ideas, and I have said little so far about  the ideas and methods
that  make  interdisciplinary  work  in  cognitive  science  possible  and  desirable.
Understanding the interdisciplinary character of cognitive science requires much more
than biography and sociology, so I now turn to a discussion of the intellectual content of
cognitive science.
Ideas
For an interdisciplinary field to have an intellectual purpose, it must involve ideas
that cut across disciplinary boundaries.   For cognitive science, the most important ideas
have  been  mental  representation,  computational  procedures,  and  the  brain  as  a
representational-computational engine.    My aim here is to describe how each of these
has helped to make possible trading zones in cognitive zones; fuller accounts of the
history and content of these ideas can be found in other sources such as Johnson-Laird
(1988), Churchland and Sejnowski (1992), and Thagard (1996).
The concept of mental representation is ancient, evident in the writings of
philosophers such as Plato, Locke, and Kant.     But in the early 1950s, especially in
American psychological circles, the concept of mind had become suspect, a metaphysical
construction incompatible with the positivist and behaviorist  prescriptions of the time.
Chomsky’s work in linguistics and Miller’s work in psychology was revolutionary in that
they allowed and required the discussion of mental representations such as rules, plans,15
and schemas.  From its beginnings, artificial intelligence was representational, writing
programs using computer structures assumed to be analogous to ones that underlie human
thought.  Cognitive theorizing has postulated various kinds of mental representation in
order to explain intelligent behavior, including sentences expressed in logical formalism,
rules, concepts, analogs, visual images, and distributed representations in artificial neural
networks (see Thagard, 1996, for a survey).    Discussion of these representations has
been at the center of interdisciplinary debates involving psychologists, AI researchers,
philosophers, linguists, neuroscientists, and anthropologists.    Although there is by no
means general agreement on which kinds of representation are most important for
explaining mental capacities, it is striking that the discussion of representation is at the
core of interdisciplinary discourse.    Heideggerians and social constructivists who
completely reject the concept of mental representation operate only at the fringes of
cognitive science.   Trading zones do not require complete agreement or a universal
vocabulary, but they do require an overlapping conceptual core among the cultures or
disciplines  that  participate  in  them.    For  cognitive  science,  the  idea  of  mental
representation is a crucial part of that core.
Although cognitive science merely revived and enriched the idea of mental
representations, it also had from the start a core idea that was much more original.   In
order to explain intelligent functioning, it is necessary to postulate not only mental
representations, but procedures that operate on them to produce performance.     Before
computational ideas came along in the 1940s, philosophers and psychologists were
limited in the kinds of processes they could discuss, for example association of ideas and
logical inference.   Moreover, it was not at all evident how such processes could be
understand mechanistically, or how the brain could carry them out.
By the early 1950s, however, the first computers were in use, and computation
was becoming understood both theoretically and practically.   The pioneers of artificial
intelligence  quickly  saw  the  potential  for  understanding  thinking  as  a  kind  of16
computation,  and  by  1956  Newell,  Shaw,  and  Simon  had  produced  the  first
computational model of human problem solving, the Logic Theorist which performed
logical proofs.   Although Chomsky has never embraced the computational view of mind,
since  he  contends  that  linguistics  need  only  explain  competence  and  can  ignore
performance, the view of thinking as analogous to or even as a kind of computation has
united many other linguists, most psychologists, some philosophers, and even cognitive
neuroscientists who understand the brain as a computational device.    It is not an
exaggeration to see cognitive science as a spin-off from a technological development –
the invention of digital computers in the 1940s.   In particular, the rapid growth of
cognitive psychology in the 1960s and 1970s employed a view of thinking as information
processing that heavily employed computational ideas and metaphors.
The major development in cognitive science in the 1980s was the growth of
connectionist models using artificial neural networks, and the most striking  expansion of
the 1990s has been in work on cognitive neuroscience using brain scanning methods
discussed in the next section.    Through this work, the computational approach to
thinking has been enriched by thinking of the brain as a representational-computational
machine and using what is known about the brain to enhance ideas about representation
and computation.    The result has been a new set of ideas that cross disciplinary
boundaries, including distributed representations and parallel processes.  Increasingly, the
brain  and  what  is  rapidly  becoming  known  about  it  are  furnishing  topics  for
interdisciplinary discourse.
Although concepts involving representation, computation, and the brain are at the
center of the cognitive science trading zone, there are other more local concepts that
provide intersections for particular pairs of disciplines.     For example, psychology,
philosophy, and AI share a concern with inference, although philosophy and AI are often
concerned more with normative issues of how people and machines should infer than
with descriptive psychological issues about how people actually do make inferences.17
Concepts of culture, long a staple of anthropological investigation, are starting to make
inroads into social and cognitive psychology.   It would be interesting to compile a
complete list of ideas at the intersection of two or more of the six disciplines   that
constitute cognitive science.
There is no reason to suppose that an interdisciplinary field such as cognitive
science should be limited to a fixed set of contributing disciplines.   Just as new cultures
can arrive to contribute to an anthropological trading zone, so new disciplines can emerge
as relevant to an interdisciplinary field.  At its inception in the 1950s, cognitive science
was mostly a mixture of psychology, artificial intelligence, and linguistics, and only later
was the strong relevance of neuroscience, philosophy, and anthropology recognized.  The
early emphasis on mental representation led to neglect of matters that have received more
attention in recent cognitive science, such as the role of the human body in cognition and
the importance of the physical and social environments in which cognition takes place.
However, the embodiment and situatedness of cognition do not provide reasons for
abandoning the representational-computational theory of mind, only for expanding and
supplementing it (Thagard, 1996).    My guess is that the next major addition to the
interdisciplinary mix of cognitive science will be molecular biology, as knowledge
increases dramatically about the genetic and chemical basis of neurological processes.
Bruer (this volume) discusses some of the potential interconnections between genetic
studies and cognitive science.  The ebb and flow of contributions of different disciplines
to an interdisciplinary field can not be managed by   any central body such as the
Cognitive Science Society, but depends on the unpredictable course of theoretical and
experimental developments.
The journal Cognitive Science currently lists education as one of the areas of
cognitive science, in addition to the six disciplines that I have been discussing.  Education
is  an  extremely  important  area  of  application  of  cognitive  science,  but  is  not  a
contributing discipline in itself.    Like other applied areas such as computer-human18
interaction and expert system development, education has provided challenging problems
for cognitive scientists to work on from an interdisciplinary perspective (Bruer, this
volume).   But education is primarily a borrower of ideas and methods rather than a
disciplinary contributor to understanding of how the mind works.
Methods
A discipline is constituted not only by its ideas but by its methods.   Typically, for
example, psychologists run experiments, AI researchers write computer programs,
linguists  analyze  languages,  and  neuroscientists  record  brain  operations.   An
interdisciplinary field requires methods that cross disciplinary boundaries, and there are
two such methods that have had the greatest impact on work in cognitive science:
computer simulation and brain scanning.   I shall briefly describe the nature of these two
methods in order to show how the cognitive science trading zone involves not only ideas
but also activities of an interdisciplinary nature.
When computers began to become available in the 1940s, scientists quickly
realized their potential for investigating physical processes.    Even when a physical
system has a mathematical description, it is often not possible to work out its behavior in
any detail, because the equations that describe it may have no tractable solution.
However, if programmable equations can be written that approximate its behavior, then
running a computer program can provide predictions about behaviors too complex to be
worked out by direct mathematical methods.  Gallison (1997) describes how computer
simulations became a standard part of the practice of physics in the 1950s, and today
computer  simulations  are  widely  used  in  disciplines  as  diverse  as  economics  and
evolutionary biology.
I have already described how cognitive science pioneers such Newell, Simon,
Miller and Minsky recognized in the 1950s the potential for computational simulation of
human thought, and such simulations have been at the core of theoretical developments in
cognitive science ever since.     In fact, computer simulations are even more central to19
cognitive science than to other disciplines, by virtue of the theoretical identification of
thinking as a kind of computation.    Computer simulation not only offers cognitive
science  the  benefit  of  complex  calculation  found  in  computer  modeling  in  such
disciplines as physics, economics, and biology, it also provides a major theoretical
impetus.     The  structures  and  procedures  in  the  computer  model  of  mind  are
hypothesized to be analogous to the mental representations and procedures that underlie
human thinking.
As in other disciplines in which computer models are useful, one of the merits of
computational models of cognition is that they serve to draw out the unforeseen empirical
consequences of cognitive theories and display their limitations. The assessment of
cognitive models should address questions such as the following (Thagard, 1998):
1.  Genuineness.  Is the model a genuine instantiation of the theoretical ideas about the
structure and growth of knowledge, and is the program a genuine implementation of the
model?
2.  Breadth of application.  Does the model apply to lots of different examples, not just
a few that have been cooked up to make the program work?
3.  Scaling.  Does the model scale up to examples that are considerably larger and more
complex than the ones to which it has been applied?
4.  Qualitative fit.  Does the computational model perform the same kinds of tasks that
people do in approximately the same way?
5.   Quantitative fit.   Can the computational model simulate quantitative aspects of
psychological experiments, e.g. ease of recall and mapping in analogy problems?
6.  Compatibility.  Does the computational model simulate representations and processes
that are compatible with those found in theoretical accounts and computational models of
other kinds of cognition?20
When such questions are addressed, computational models of human cognition can
provide valuable insights into the nature of the mind and potential applications to areas
such as education.
Computer simulation is an interdisciplinary method for two reasons.   First,
computational  modeling  is  not  normally  part  of  the  training  of  psychologists,
philosophers, neuroscientists, linguists, or anthropologists, and second, it usually draws
on ideas about structures and algorithms that are part of the branch of computer science
called artificial intelligence.    But computer simulation is obviously not just part of
computer science and artificial intelligence, since knowledge of psychology, philosophy,
language, or neuroscience is crucial for determining what to simulate.   The method of
computer simulation requires either (1) interdisciplinary collaboration between computer
scientists  and  members  of  other  interdisciplinary  fields  or  (2)  the  acquisition  by
individuals  from  a  particular  discipline  of  ideas  and  skills  from  the  other.
A great deal of cognitive modeling has been accomplished by psychologists who have
stepped  outside  the  typically  empirical  orientation  of  their  discipline  to  acquire
computational skills in order to perform computational simulations.     More rare are AI
researchers who have acquired sufficient knowledge of psychology or linguistics to
produce computational models in these areas, and rarer still are philosophers who have
adopted computational modeling as a methodology.
Another interdisciplinary method has become important to cognitive science in
recent  decades.   Brain  imaging  began  in  the  early  1970s  when  x-ray  computed
tomography was developed (Posner and Raichle, 1994).    Soon, developments such as
positron emission tomography  (PET) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) made it
possible to image the brain’s changing blood flow during sensory stimulation and
cognitive operations.     These instruments depended on many technological advances,
including the availability of computers to collect data and produce interpretations of brain
activity.   In the 1980s, cognitive psychologists such as Michael Posner began to use PET21
and MRI to determine the operations that the brain performs when people are given
experimental tasks that had been used in experiments over the preceding three decades.
Edward Smith (1997, p. 72), another cognitive psychologist turned neural imager, reports
that cognitive psychologists are turning to neuroscience for several reasons.    First,
neuroscientists have found out a great deal about the neural bases of memory and are now
able to use PET and MRI to observe brain changes while an organism is engaged in
various  tasks.    These  results  place  constraints  on  cognitive  theories.    Second,
neuroimaging techniques may eventually provide more directly interpretable information
than that obtained in strictly cognitive experiments.   Third, cognitive neuroscience can
also suggest new ways of dividing cognition into meaningful areas of study.  In recent
years, many leading cognitive psychologists have shifted their research in neuroscientific
directions.
Thus brain scanning is a new method which ties together cognitive psychology
and neuroscience and which is beginning to yield results of interest to linguists and
philosophers as well.    Like computer simulation, it is an inherently interdisciplinary
method, since it requires the knowledge and skills of both experimental psychologists and
neuroscientists.    This new intersection has spawned new journals such as Cognitive
Neuroscience  and a new organization, the Cognitive Neuroscience Society, with its own
annual meeting.    Neural imaging is potentially a complementary method to computer
simulation, since the information it provides can contribute ideas and constraints on
computational models of how the brain processes information.    For example, Kosslyn
(1994) uses imaging studies and computational models in a complementary fashion to
defend strong theoretical claims about visual imagery.   We can expect these two
interdisciplinary methods to continue to work together as cognitive science continues.
Let us now look at a more specific case of interdisciplinary research.
Case Study:  Analogy Research22
Over the past two decades, research on analogical thinking has been one of the
most  successful  areas  in  cognitive  science,  and  it  well  illustrates  the  benefits  of
interdisciplinary collaboration.    I will not try to survey that research (see Holyoak and
Thagard, 1995), and certainly want to avoid any kind of partisan defense of my own
views  over  those  of  other  analogy  researchers.   Rather,  I  want  to  describe  how
interdisciplinary research on analogy has benefited from trading zones comprised of
people, places, organizations, ideas, and methods.
Before 1980, analogy was primarily a topic discussed by philosophers such as
Hesse (1966), but cognitive research has since flourished.  Ignoring many independent
researchers, we can divide the most active participants into four main camps:
1.   Structure mapping theory, comprising Dedre Gentner, Ken Forbus, and numerous
collaborators.
2.   Multiconstraint theory, comprising Keith Holyoak, Paul Thagard, and numerous
collaborators.
3.    Case-based reasoning, comprising Janet Kolodner, Chris Hammond, Colleen Seifert,
and numerous other researchers inspired by Roger Schank.
4.  Fluid analogies research group, comprising Douglas Hofstadter, Melanie Mitchell, and
other collaborators.
Notably, the first three groups involved a mixture of psychologists whose research
consists primarily of experiments (Gentner, Holyoak, Seifert) and AI researchers who
produce computer programs (Forbus, Thagard, Kolodner, Hammond).       All three of
these projects have involved interconnected work on both psychological experimentation
and computer modeling.    Hofstadter’s group has not been so explicitly psychological,
but has been interdisciplinary in its own way, involving people with backgrounds in
computer science, philosophy, and physics. None of these analogy researchers produces
both computational models and psychological experiments alone, but all have willingly
expanded beyond their initial training disciplines.23
Places were crucial in the initial constitution of all of these groups.   Holyoak and
I got together at the University of Michigan in the early 1980s.   Gentner and Forbus
began collaborating at the University of Illinois in the 1980s and have continued together
at Northwestern University in the 1990s.   The case-based reasoning group were mostly
graduate students at Yale in the 1980s when an active cognitive science program formed
by Schank and Robert Abelson brought together students from both psychology and
computer science.    Hofstadter’s group began at the University of Indiana, moved to
Michigan, then back to Indiana.    Cognitive science programs have been active at all four
institutions crucial to the rise of analogy research in the 1980s – Michigan, Illinois, Yale,
and Indiana.
Other organizations also helped move research along.    Annual meetings of the
Cognitive Science Society provided occasions for debate and exchange of information.
For example, a symposium in 1993 on cognitive models of problem solving included
presentations by Gentner, Forbus, Holyoak, Thagard, Seifert, and Hammond.   Gentner,
Holyoak, Seifert, Thagard, and Forbus have all been elected to the governing board of the
society.  Funding organizations have been crucial for fostering interdisciplinary research.
From 1986 to 1992, Holyoak and I were  funded by the Basic Research Office of the U.S.
Army Research Institute, and the Office of Naval Research has provided funding for
collaborative projects by Gentner and Forbus and by Hammond and Seifert.
All four analogy research projects described above have worked within the
fundamental hypothesis of cognitive science, that thinking consists of computational
processes operating on mental representations.    Although there has been much dispute
concerning the particular nature of the processes and representations used in analogical
thinking, the different approaches all share fundamental ideas about the nature of mind
operations.    Similarly, we all take for granted the value of  combining multiple methods,
involving both psychological experimentation and computational modeling.24
Application of multiple methods requires broader collaboration,  as evident in the
case of the multiconstraint theory: figure 1 displays analogy collaborations of Holyoak
and  Thagard  up  to  1995.     Most  of  Holyoak’s  collaborators  were  involved  in
psychological  experiments,  although  Hummel  and  Melz  in  particular  contributed
computational models.   In my research, Cohen, Gochfeld, Hardy, Nelson, and Fleck all
worked on computational modeling, Buchanan and Joordens developed psychological
experiments, and Barnes and Shelley helped with philosophical analyses.   Similar
diagrams could be produced for the other analogy research groups.
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Figure 1.  Collaborators of Holyoak and Thagard between 1980 and 1995.
Source:  Thagard (1999), p. 183.
What have the numerous groups of people, places, organizations, ideas, and
methods contributed to the understanding of analogical thinking?    In contrast to the
situation before 1980, there is now a wealth of experimental data on how people use
analogies and rich theoretical explanations of how minds think analogically.   Theoretical
advances have involved intense interaction between psychological experiments and
computational models.    For example, after Holyoak and his co-workers performed
experiments on analogical problem solving, he and I set out to produce a computational
model of such thinking.  Our first attempt, the PI model of analogy, failed to convince25
even us, and we were impelled to   produce the multiconstraint models of   analogical
mapping and retrieval, which in turn led to further psychological experiments (see
Holyoak and Thagard, 1995, for the whole story).  Similarly, Gentner, Forbus and their
collaborators have benefited from alternation and interpenetration of psychological
experimentation and computational modeling.    The neurological study of analogical
thinking using brain scanning is just beginning.
Conclusion
Cognitive science has been successful as an interdisciplinary field because of the
establishment of fertile trading zones at the intersections of its six constituent disciplines.
I have described how these trading zones have been constituted by people, places,
organizations, ideas, and methods.    Cognitive science has flourished due to the presence
of:
•  people, both at the inception and in the maturity of the field, who are  willing and
eager to cross disciplinary boundaries;
•  places where interdisciplinary communication and communication is encouraged;
•  organizations  such  as  societies  and  journals  that  foster  interdisciplinary
communication;
•  ideas  that  provide  bridges  between  disciplines  and  show  that  problems  cross
disciplines;
•  methods that require participation of people trained in more than one discipline.
These factors have enabled cognitive science to have the kind of overlaps between
disciplines recommended by Campbell (this volume) with his fish-scale model of
knowledge.
I  suspect  that  the  same  factors  have  been  crucial  to  the  success  of  other
interdisciplinary fields.    For example, history and philosophy of science emerged in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, and has benefited from:26
•  pioneers such as  N. R. Hanson, Thomas Kuhn, and Stephen Toulmin whose work
was both philosophical and historical;
•  places such as Princeton University, Cambridge University, Indiana University, and
the University of Pittsburgh  that encouraged interdisciplinary work;
•  journals such as Studies in History and Philosophy of Science  that invite work from
more than one discipline;
•  methods combining historical interpretation and philosophical analysis.
It would be interesting to attempt to apply my five-fold analysis of interdisciplinary
trading zones to other fields.   It would also be interesting to discuss the question of how
undergraduate and graduate education can foster future work in cognitive science.   One
consequence of the above analysis is that training in cognitive science  should involve not
only acquisition of the representational-computational  ideas that connect disciplines, but
also training in the methods that operate at the core of interdisciplinary research.  Such
training should enable future students to thrive in the twenty-first-century trading zones
of cognitive science.
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artificial
intelligence
linguistics neuroscience philosophy psychology
Chomsky √ √ √
Miller √ √ √ √
Minsky √ √ √
Newell √ √
Simon √ √ √
Table 1.   Interdisciplinary interests of some of the founders of cognitive science.31
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